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WALTER KAUFMANN AND THE FUTURE
OF THE HUMANITIES
Summary: Walter Kaufmann (1921–1980) is best remembered for his work
on Nietzsche. However, from 1950 to the end of his life he produced a wing-raging
and provocative body of philosophical criticism. At the heart of Kaufmann’s efforts
was a concern for the humanities and its role in modern intellectual life. Kaufmann’s
central meditation on this subject, The Future of the Humanities (1970) deserves
more attention that it has received so far. It finds a way to blend two fundamental
goals of contemporary theory, a quest of authenticity and the desire to foster a criti-
cal spirit. The way Kaufmann achieved these goals, testifying to his ongoing rele-
vance for those who care about the humanities, is the subject of this essay.
Key words: humanities, authenticity, critical spirit.
“…And woe unto all the living that it would
live without disputes over weight and scales
and weighers!” Nietzsche, Zarathustra, II, 13
1.
The start of 21st century may very well be the final era in
which the humanities enjoy substantial autonomy and prestige. Ad-
vances in genetics, evolutionary and biological psychology, as well
as the increasing sophistication of statistical models of behavior pre-
diction, may make current justifications for the study of the humani-
ties sound quaint at best, and obscurantist at worse. To be sure, the
end of the humanities has been predicted before, and its decline or
demise may never happen.1 I am not saying that I want it to happen,
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1 An interesting and salutary reminder of how current debates might not be as
current as we think can be found in a 1930 essay by Sherlock Bronson Gass entitled
“The Well of Discipline,” reprinted in Humanism and America, ed. Norman Foerster
(Farrar and Reinhardt: 1930). Speaking as a humanist, Gass worried openly about
“the contrast between the fruitfulness of the scientific world, its vitality, its harmony,
its worldwide cooperation, and our frankly acknowledged moral bankruptcy—vigor
only that, as Walter Kaufmann put it, “the refusal to reflect on goals
invites disaster.”2 In this respect, I think it is best to consider the
prospects for the humanities without two implicit, and sentimental,
assumptions. They are that, without the humanities, something irre-
placeably precious will be lost, and that, once we move beyond the
humanities, what would come would certainly be better. We simply
don’t know how things will look from the standpoint of future gener-
ations.3 Rather, our task should be to identify what things are most
valuable in the humanities, asking ourselves whether our current
practices in fact achieve these goals.
To aid in this discussion, I want to turn to Walter Kaufmann
who, a generation ago, had some interesting ideas about what was at
stake in the study of the humanities. I will present some of Kauf-
mann’s main views on this subject, concentrating on his critique of
contemporary education. My overarching goal is to show that his
1977 volume, The Future of the Humanities, is not only worth read-
ing and applying today, but may help the humanities maintain their
viability altogether. To reach this end, I will place Kaufmann in his
historical context, providing an exposition of his main pedagogical
ideas, focusing especially on what he called “the art of reading.”4
Once a picture of Kaufmann’s main contribution has emerged, I will
finish the piece by linking Kaufmann to a current concern in peda-
126
D
AV
ID
PI
CK
US
and fecundity into the area into which discipline has been shifted and chaos in the
area in which discipline has been withdrawn.” (p. 283) While Gass’s understanding
of “moral bankruptcy” may no longer be in perfect accord with contemporary con-
cerns, his sense of alarm that the humanities are not proficient and adequate in the
areas where they most need to be is an ongoing one, and thus one that should be ad-
dressed with an eye toward the ways it has been treated in the past.
2 Walter Kaufmann (with a new introduction by Saul Goldwasser), The Futu-
re of the Humanities: Teaching Art, Religion, Philosophy Literature and History
(Transaction Publishers: 1995), first published by Readers Digest Press in 1977.
Henceforth, this book is referred to as “TFH.”
3 Naturally, the critical nature of present concerns will press for a continual
discussion of the future of the humanities, and that of education in general. An espe-
cially helpful bibliographic overview of these discussions, particularly as they relate
to the future of higher education, is to be found at an Ohio State University website:
http://humanities.osu.edu/news/forums/spring03/bibliography.cfm. In the Spring of
2003, OSU sponsored a forum on the future of the public research university. The
useful “readings of interest” they provide underscore the importance of inquiring into
the ends of humanities education altogether.
4 For the “art of reading,” see pages 47-83 in TFH.
gogy, namely Gerald Graff’s efforts to integrate students into aca-
demic “argument culture” by “teaching the conflicts.”5 Though the
comparison of Graff to Kaufmann will be critical, the point is neither
to dismiss Graff’s case utterly, or depreciate his concerns, but to
demonstrate how he falls short of his own goals, and how Kauf-
mann’s suggestions can serve to revive them. This sets the stage for
an overarching conclusion, where I argue that, while Kaufmann cer-
tainly does not reveal the future of the humanities, his ideas about
education (primarily, though not exclusively, college education) pre-
pare us well to face our own uncertainties and sense of doubt as to
whether or not instructors can convey something of value in the hu-
manities altogether.
2.
Kaufmann (1921-80), longtime professor of philosophy at
Princeton, is best remembered for his translations of Nietzsche, along
with his general effort at bringing central European thought to the
US.6 His 1956 anthology, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre,
is still in print. He also wrote several interesting and idiosyncratic
philosophical works of his own, primarily in the philosophy of reli-
gion, ethics and aesthetics. His works have never fully caught on with
academic philosophers, but he has always maintained a certain de-
gree of popularity, both among undergraduates, and a wider reading
public.7 Kaufmann himself, to some degree, relished this outsider sta-
tus. His works were sharply critical of what he considered to be a
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095 See Graff’s 1992 Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts can
Revitalize American Education (Norton: 1992)and his 2003, Clueless in Academe:
How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind (Yale U Press: 2003).
6 Kaufmann’s main Nietzsche translations can be found in The Portable
Nietzsche (Viking: 1977, first published 1954) and The Basic Writings of Nietzsche
(The Modern Library: 2000, first published 1967). Kaufmann’s own exposition of
Nietzsche is found in his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Prince-
ton: 4th edition 1974, first published 1950).
7 This can be seen in a website about Kaufmann hosted by Andrew Spear:
http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~adspear/Kaufmann%20entrance.htm. Spear provides
a full listing of Kaufmann’s writings and reaches a wide variety of readers, academics
and non-academics alike. There are not many published studies of Kaufmann’s
works, though this is changing. Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen of the University of
Miami has a forthcoming article on Kaufmann, “Dionysian Enlightenment.”
strain of escapism in the professional philosophy of his day. What ap-
pealed to him in philosophy was—to adapt Alcibiades’ words in the
Symposium—its Socratic capacity to make one ashamed of the life he
or she is living.8 This does not require the philosopher to be com-
pletely right, as much as it demands they identify errors and prod oth-
ers to reach higher. As Kaufmann put it in a 1958 work, long before
the notion of “subversion” was fashionable, “philosophy subverts
man’s satisfaction with himself, exposes custom as a questionable
dream, and offers not so much solutions as a different life.”9 When he
turned to pedagogy, therefore, it was not to restore the validity of an
enduring canon, nor was it to advocate a new turn, in the direction of
relevance. Rather, it was to confront an enduring problem, one made
more pressing by the increasing prominence of the sciences. This
problem can be defined as one of “blindness.” As he put it:
Blindness can be taught and has been for centuries. A great
deal of education has always been indoctrination. Students
were taught what to see and exhorted not to see inconvenient
facts, alternatives, or even their own beliefs. Piety consisted
in staying inside, in the dark, believing what you were told.
To see for yourself or go outside to find out how your beliefs
looked when you stepped back far enough was impiety.10
Thus, when he claimed that that, “the sad condition of the hu-
manities should be a matter of vital concern for all of us,” he meant
that the obvious blindness of previous ages was not really overcome.
It was simply replaced with less visible “pieties.”11 He is hardly
alone in seeing conformity in academia,12 so what, exactly, was his
version of the problem?
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8 See the Symposium, 216a.
9 Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Anchor Books:
1958), p. 10. This point is amplified in several other places in Kaufmann’s writing. See,
especially, his The Faith of a Heretic (1959, 1961). There books combine an anti-aut-
horitarianism with a deep respect for tradition. This lays the foundation for the notion
Kaufmann developed in The Future of the Humanities that instructors do not need to
claim an air of infallibility in order to help students identify errors in the past.
10 TFH, p. 154.
11 TFH, p. xxix
12 Page Smith’s Killing the Spirit (Viking: 1990) makes some of the same
points, albeit for somewhat different reasons. It is interesting to compare these two
works as pendant volumes.
3.
Put most directly, the problem is that teachers of the humani-
ties fail to read well, and are passing this failure on to their stu-
dents.13 Kaufmann thought the humanities were only justified to the
extent that they cultivated what can be called “the authenticity of
reading.” What this meant was that, “we must allow ourselves to be
addressed by a text, we must hearken for its distinctive voice, we
must try to discern how it differs from all other voices. We must per-
mit it to challenge shock and offend us.”14 However, in the practices
he saw around him, he charged that, “one reads without encounter-
ing a You and takes no chances of suffering culture shock.” The
problem was that, “though written by men and women, the texts are
dehumanized and read in a parochial spirit.”15 Even very sophisti-
cated methodological approaches can deflect attention away from a
text’s individual challenge.16
To clarify what he meant Kaufmann identified three strategies
of evasion. They are “exegetical,” “dogmatic” and “agnostic” read-
ing, and he felt they were common in humanities courses, past as well
as present. All are variant ways of not thinking about a text’s central
problems and the challenges they pose to our view of things. “Exe-
getes,” for Kaufmann, “first endowed the text with authority, then
read their own ideas into it, and then got them back endowed with au-
thority.”17 If the message of the Gospel of St. John is “determined” to
be completely compatible with, say, Marxism or existentialism, and
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13 The point is made directly on TFH, p. 47, “Reading is the core of the humani-
ties and social sciences, but most students never learn to read well.” It is interesting to
read these comments in conjunction with what Robert M. Hutchins had said earlier in
his Great Books: The Foundation of a Liberal Education (Simon and Schuster: 1954).
14 TFH, p. 63.
15 TFH, p. 59.
16 In his Discovering the Mind, Volume One: Goethe, Kant and Hegel (Trans-
action: 1991, first published 1980), Kaufmann went as far as to argue that even an un-
deniably great philosopher like Kant could advance hypotheses that were a “disaster”
(p. 5) when it came to advancing human self-knowledge. A separate discussion
would be required to grasp why he said this, but it helps bring out the point that Kauf-
mann did not presume that taking up the most forbidding ideas of a well-regarded
writer was, in and of itself, the royal road to good pedagogy.
17 TFH, p. 48. For a specific illustration of why Kaufmann felt this was the
wrong approach, see the critique of Heidegger in Discovering the Mind, Volume Two:
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber (Transaction: 1991, first published 1980), especial-
ly p. 195-97.
then declared to be true because it is the Bible, we are reading
exegetically. This shades into dogmatic reading, whereby readers
take the stance, “we know and he doesn’t.”18 If the books of Islamic
Hadith or Jewish Midrash are measured by the standards of Christian
theological dogma and then found to be lacking, then, for Kaufmann,
this is reading dogmatically. As he put charged, “the dogmatic reader
avoids self-exposure, blinds himself to alternatives and objections,
and refuses to see what is distinctive in the text and could not just as
well be found at home.”19 Finally, there is agnostic approach, which
revolves around “suspending judgment” about the truth. For Kauf-
mann, it can take on a myriad of forms, but always involves not think-
ing about the text’s primary messages. The variant that he found most
prevalent in his own day was the “microscopic,” meaning that “one
no longer has breath enough to read a book several times to get a
whole view, not to speak of an author’s oeuvre. One prefers to study
one poem, one passage or one argument. In this way the author is
spirited away, the encounter with a challenging You is avoided, and
one deals with small pieces that can be taken apart.”20 If these strate-
gies of evasion are followed, blindness, rather than insight, is taught.
4.
At this point, a readermaywish to raise two objections. First, a
great deal of the past generation’s “theory” has disputed the notion
that one can approach a text in an unmediated fashion.21 Therefore,
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18 TFH, p. 55.
19 TFH, p. 57.
20 TFH, p. 58. The notion of a “You” in a text may remind American readers of
Martin Buber. Yet the claim that knowledge—particularly knowledge in the humani-
ties—required a kind of empathy that “re-constructed” the thoughts of others was well
established in the German intellectual tradition. A important figure in this respect, and
an author with whom Buber and Kaufmann were familiar was Wilhem Dilthey
(1833-1991). His Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften has been translated into En-
glish as Introduction to the Human Sciences (Princeton: 1985), ed. Rudolph A. Mak-
krel and Frithjof Rodi. Even if one disagrees with some of Dilthey’s main contentions,
more familiarity with this work would enrich the debate of the humanities in the US.
21 Without question, one of the abiding concerns of twentieth-century literary
criticism has been the effort to demonstrate the ostensible naiveté of presuming un-
problematic “given meanings in the interpretation of texts. For a now standard work
in this regard see Stanley Fish’s Is there a Text in this Class: The Authority of Inter-
pretive Communities (Harvard: 1980). Kaufmann, for his part, never spoke of time-
isn’t there something naïve about Kaufmann’s contention that stu-
dents can access the distinctive “You” in any given text. Second, isn’t
what Kaufmann has to say obvious? After all, who consciously ar-
gues for parochialism in the reading and teaching of texts? Kauf-
mann, therefore, will never convince those he ismost trying to reach.
These two objections, placed together, are somewhat contra-
dictory. However, they add up to a consistent enough claim that what
Kaufmann said is familiar, and hasn’t the force to challenge current
ways of doing things. In such a case, it is pointless to respond to
these objections with the contradictory assertion that Kaufmann is,
indeed, relevant. That will only convince those already on Kauf-
mann’s side. Rather, the best approach is to practice a bit of what he
preached and to spend a bit of time uncovering Kaufmann’s own,
distinctive presence. In particular, it is most helpful to bear in mind
that Kaufmann had a hyphenated identity, not so much “Ger-
man-American,” as “refugee-American.” Kaufmann grew up in Ber-
lin, and probably never would have come to America had it not been
for the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Indeed, he says as much in The
Future of the Humanities. Escaping, alone, to the US in January,
1939, he enrolled for his BA at Williams College. He was seventeen
at the time, and though we may consider a BA the obvious choice,
Kaufmann thought in European terms, and believed that his natural
path was to proceed straight on to specialized study of philosophy.
“Having graduated from a German secondary school,” he wrote, “I
could have entered a university and obtained a doctorate in three
years, had it not been for Hitler.”22 As it turned out, his education
was much more American than he anticipated, and in many ways he
profited from the fact that he did not become a typical product of the
German system, but was, so to speak, a hybrid of Jewish Central-Eu-
ropean and American sensibilities.23
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less and pre-discursively given meanings. Rather, his concern was that, in the search
for meaning, people did not abandon what Nietzsche called “the intellectual cons-
cience” or the careful reflection on objection and alternate arguments.
22 TFH, p. 165.
23 It should be mentioned that, as a teenager, he knew Martin Buber personally,
and some of his ideas about a “distinctive You” were formed under Buber’s influen-
ce. Also, at Williams, Kaufmann studied with James Bissett Pratt (1875-1944), a
mostly forgotten scholar who was one of the founders of the comparative and psy-
chological study of religion in America. Pratt was a clear, thoughtful and thorough
All this is essential background for understanding Kauf-
mann’s case, since his thoughts on education arose directly from his
experience in both the old and new worlds. Like other Jewish émigré
scholars—Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and Karl Popper come to
mind—Kaufmann was preoccupied with the concern that civiliza-
tion not succumb to the forces of organized irrationality. Yet, Kauf-
mann was younger and more “Americanized” than these writers. He
very much appreciated the world of learning he was brought into. He
said that “in a way a good liberal arts college is an isle of the blessed
in a cruel world,” going on to add:
I can think of no better way of showing this then to recall my
own experience of coming to such a college in 1939. I had left
Nazi Germany, crossed the Atlantic in a hurricane, and sud-
denly found myself in an altogether different world. In ever so
many tangible ways, I encountered freedom. The students
could pursue their intellectual interests and the professors
could do the same. It would have been boorish to ask about
the purpose of all of this; it was so beautiful.24
Nevertheless, what is beautiful may not be up to the chal-
lenges the world presents. Kaufmann noted that on the eve of Amer-
ica’s entry into World War Two (in which a number of his fellow stu-
dents were to die), Williams College, “might almost as well have
been on the moon,”25 so distant did it seem from the catastrophes un-
folding in Europe and Asia. Exacerbating this tendency, and making
it more harmful, was an ongoing spiritual insularity:
It was in those days that it was considered admirable for a
teacher to be Socratic…But it was difficult to find professors
who ran any risk of ever being accused of impiety, as Socrates
was. One was genteel and did not think of questioning the
faith and morals of one’s society—at least not in one’s own
way, without the support of any rival creed or ideology, like
Socrates.26
132
D
AV
ID
PI
CK
US
writer. His books can still be read with profit. See his, The Religious Consciousness:
A Psychological Study (Macmillan: 1920).
24 TFH, p. 165.
25 TFH, p. 166.
26 TFH, p. 167.
America’s victory, The Cold War, and all its attendant social
transformations forever changed the American university, moving
away from what Kaufmann called “the age of teacups” to the “age of
specialization.”27 In this era—one that is still with us—research, ex-
pansion of capacities and technique and professionalization domi-
nate individual and collective agendas. Kaufmann was not utterly
opposed to specialization (the same way he was not utterly opposed
to the sheltered freedom of the old-fashioned liberal arts college).
Yet, as he saw it, “some realize that specialization is an indispens-
able propaedeutic. Others go on to specialize more and more to be-
come great experts on something so small and often trivial that no-
body except a few other pedants in the same boat would ever like to
hear about it. That is the direction in which the humanities have
moved since the fifties and they did not start from scratch even
then.”28 Exacerbating matters was the fact that Kaufmann felt stu-
dents were arriving at universities without the mastery of basic skills
that would enable them to focus on their studies, making disciplined
progress from there. Thus, at the worst, a small circle tends to culti-
vate the humanities in an overly narrow fashion, while the majority
dabbles in the humanities without any though understanding of how
to advance.29 For different reasons, members of each group are un-
likely to be reached by the material to which they are exposed.
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27 An interesting “macro” overview of the events Kaufmann describes in
found in Bruce A. Kimball’s A Orators and Philosophers: History of the Idea of Li-
beral Education (College Entrance Examination Board: 1995). Much of Kaufmann’s
account is commensurate with what Kimball reports, though Kimball sees the roots
of specialization beginning in pre World War II days.
28 TFH, p. 175.
29 Kaufmann’s praise of self-discipline is best understood in light of his appro-
priation of Nietzsche. On p. 162 of TFH, he wrote that, “without self-discipline there is
no mastery of any kind, nor autonomy, nor creativity that keeps on yielding satisfac-
tion. Self-discipline is not enough, but those who lack it head for slavery or despair, or
both.” Despite the notion, popular in some quarters, that Nietzsche preached a wild li-
beration from all restrain, in his own work on Nietzsche, Kaufmann emphasized
Nietzsche’s arguments in favor of self-mastery, and his conviction that self-overco-
ming is the precondition for all educational progress. Along these lines, the one specific
recommendation Kaufmann made for pre-college education is to point out that “chil-
dren will soon cease to get much satisfaction from their work if they do not feel that
they are making progress and can point to an occasional triumph.” (p. 162) Turning
everything into progress and triumph and treating that as the only possible outcome
undermines education. To see how this follows from Kaufmann’s understanding of
These conclusions leave more to discuss. However, they do
provide some insight into Kaufmann’s “distinctive You.” What mat-
tered to him was that the expanded, ever more market driven, pursuit
of the humanities on American campuses not squander its opportuni-
ties to provoke Socratic questioning and critical self-reflection.30
After all, Kaufmann saw himself what happened when these virtues
were lost.
5.
Of course, this does not directly answer the concerns raised
earlier. What distinguishes Kaufmann’s suggestions from other cri-
tiques (and complaints) about the state of the humanities? Here, we
can turn to a specific proposal Kaufmann made for a course in com-
parative religion. As Kaufmann’s friend, Saul Goldwasser, rightly
pointed out, for Kaufmann, “religious texts provide the perfect sub-
ject matter for Socratic scrutiny, and dialectical reading.”31 Kauf-
mann made this point by noting that, “it is in religion that faith and
morals are encountered par excellence, and in different religions, if
not different sects and phases of the same ones, we find radically di-
vergent faiths and moral views.”32 His proposed one-term course
would cover parts of the Old and New Testaments, the Koran, The
Dhammapada, The Bhagavad-Gita, the Confucian Analects and the
Tao-Teh-Ching.33 The most important consequence of the course
would be that students see that these works do not necessarily say
what they think religion teaches, and that compared to each other, all
outline distinctive ways of life, ones that spark an existential aware-
ness of human choices and limitations.
Thus, Kaufmann’s view should not be equated with the con-
servative notion that there is a set canon of unchanging classics and
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Nietzsche see p. 216 of his short essay “How Nietzsche Revolutionized Ethics” re-
printed in From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Princeton: 1979, first published 1959).
30 Kaufmann’s student, Ivan Soll, argued that though Kaufmann did not live to
see the predominance of postmodernism in certain sectors of academia, what he has
to say about the abandonment of meaning as an intellectual ideas remains relevant to-
day. See Soll’s introduction to Discovering the Mind, Volume Two: Nietzsche, Hei-
degger and Buber (Transaction: 1991, first published 1980).
31 Introduction, TFH, p. xxi.
32 TFH, p. 129.
33 For a full outline of the course, see TFH, p. 134-36.
enduring verities. Rather, each text has its own history, and students
should grasp something of the conflict-laden manner in which it
took shape and developed. By the same token, seeing texts histori-
cally does not entail reading one’s own ideas into a work, or substi-
tuting more amenable texts for those that have been, historically,
most challenging and influential. Kaufmann charged that, “more and
more students graduate from college having read a lot of recent arti-
cles and books that are but a short while later as dated and forgotten
as of most of last year’s headlines. Meanwhile, even art historians
rarely know the Bible.”34
What, specifically, made Kaufmann’s proposed course
better? Two advantages can be singled out. First, they would treat re-
ligious texts in an interdisciplinary fashion. In Kaufmann’s under-
standing, those within a disciplinary specialty should take the trou-
ble to explain clearly to those outside it why they thought one way,
rather than another. Such efforts are central because “they force us to
step back sufficiently to see the context of our specialty and become
aware of our assumptions.”35 In an undergraduate class, the instruc-
tor may have to “play all the disciplines,” but the students should ac-
quire some sense of what it does and does not mean to look at a text
in different ways. Second, his course encouraged students to think
about translation, broadly defined. Kaufmann did not simply suggest
that “The Bible” be assigned to students. He wanted those unable to
read it in the original to, at least, compare various translations, and
think about meanings and perspectives that might be lost. This was
not a minor concern for him. He devoted a section of The Future of
the Humanities to discussing translation and its problems. A com-
ment he made on the failure to take notice of these matters reveals
something of his overall pedagogical goals. The smaller issue under
discussion was the fact that Freud is often read exclusively in what is
called “The Standard Translation.” Kaufmann used this to make a
larger point:
Freud was one of the greatest writers of our century, and he is
extremely difficult to translate. Anyone who tries to translate
no more than the quotations he needs in a scholarly discussion
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34 TFH, p. 21.
35 TFH, p. 42.
of Freud quickly finds how much is lost in the process. More-
over, Freud, more than anyone with the possible exception of
Nietzsche, has taught us to attend to nuances, and it is odd that
people writing seriously about him should feel no need what-
soever to do so.
In the classroom, the goal would be to guard against such pa-
rochialism by making the difficulties of translation an ongoing spur
to candor and self-reflection. Indeed, consideration of the hazards of
translation is an initial step in a path of discovery. By this method,
students truly would be exposed to alternative world views. Hence,
they would be forced to decide what speaks for and against them.
6.
But doesn’t every teacher of the humanities try to do all this
anyway? This is a difficult issue because if one speaks in generalities
there is a tendency to amalgamate Kaufmann’s concerns to a general-
ized quest for “engagement” that is very common in the literature on
the humanities and its pedagogy.36 Hence, I want to conclude with a
brief comparison between Kaufmann’s approach and other, popular,
ideas. First, it is worth noting that Kaufmann’s ideas cut across ideo-
logical divides. Take, for instance, a debate on “active learning” or a
“student centered classroom.” By Kaufmann’s standards this could
cut either way. Students given informal or community building exer-
cisesmay engage the spirit of a text more closely, and then again, they
may not. The important issue is the discovery of a “distinctive You”
in a challenging text. We should not lose sight of this goal.
This leads to a second point, one where we can introduce Ger-
ald Graff. He has argued that have argued that humanities instructors
136
D
AV
ID
PI
CK
US
36 One possible point of departure would be to ask students in education
schools to compare the ideas on critical engagement they found in Kaufmann (and
perhaps also Jacques Barzun, with whom Kaufmann shares certain similarities) with
the ideas on critical engagement that they find in current pedagogical theory. The
goal would not be to disparage what is recent in favor of Kaufmann, or vice versa, but
to get them to reflect on their own training, and to think about which tasks in the hu-
manities for which they are being prepared, and which they will have to make up on
their own. Irresistible, incidentally, is Barzun’s comment that “education in the Uni-
tes States is a passion and a paradox. Millions want it and commend it, and are busy
about it, at the same time as they are willing to degrade it by trying to get it free of
charge and free of work.” The House of Intellect (Harper & Brothers: 1959).
should “teach the conflicts,” which in practice means that they
should be introduced to secondary, critical literature, and then clari-
fying to students what is at stake in this academic conversation.
While I share a number of Graff’s concerns, from a Kaufmann-ian
standpoint, it is worth asking whether there truly is an academic con-
versation, or only a series of time-bound and sectarian controversies.
After all, reading and discussing six scholarly articles on St. Thomas
Aquinas may help students form their own ideas about him, but then
again it may not. Suppose four of those articles accepted all of St.
Thomas’ presuppositions unquestioningly, while a fifth denounced
him for being a tool of feudal landlords, and the six is not really in-
terested in anything except the ways some ideas from the Summa
Theologica can be taken from their original context and used to en-
dorse the ideas of a much different philosopher who lived hundreds
of years later. To be sure, even if Graff will not use a term like “spirit
of the text,” he does want the scholarly criticism that students read to
direct attention to uncovering the text’s possible meanings.
But what are students then to do after they use secondary
sources to uncover possible meanings? In Beyond the Culture Wars,
Graff approached this issue in a sidelong fashion by maintaining that
since “there is, alas, no trouble free zone of reading,”37 we might as
well avoid turning our classes into “noncommunicating monolo-
gues” and teach the intellectual controversies about what this mean-
ing is. If students were taught these intellectual conflicts over a poem
like “Dover Beach,” then, according to Graff, “they might also find
it easier to make out the sense of the poem, for the controversy over it
might give them the sort of context for reading it that they probably
lack.” Yet, immediately after saying this, Graff attaches a significant
condition, namely that:
The controversy would have to be presented in a way that
avoids the pedantry, obscurity and technicality to which aca-
demics are notoriously prone. And even when these vices are
avoided, some students will have as much trouble seeing why
they should interest themselves in a critical debate over “Do-
ver Beach” as in “Dover Beach” itself.38
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37 Beyond the Culture Wars, p. 56.
38 Beyond the Culture Wars, p. 57.
Graff goes on to attribute students’ indifference or incompre-
hension to their “alienation from academic intellectual culture,”39
which leads him to the conclusion that this “is all the more reason for
teaching the debate.”40 But putting it this way simply leads us back to
the place that Kaufmann began, i.e., the task of letting the text some-
how challenge our ideas and beliefs.41 If humanities instructors have
no clear idea of this, howwill they ever knowwhether they are indeed
overcoming student alienation and teaching conflicts? As Kaufmann
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39 Beyond the Culture Wars, p. 57.
40 Beyond the Culture Wars, p. 57.
41 It is unfair to Graff to sum up the contents of two books without providing at
least one extended illustration of the problem I am criticizing. For this reason, I want to
give one example, if not to settle the matter, then at least to clarify why I’ve reached my
conclusion. As part of his argument in the “Clueless” book that student writing can be
improved if they enter into conversationwith ongoing scholarly debates, Graff introdu-
ces the case of “Ellen,” a student writing on the novel Things Fall Apart. Ellen has said
that the protagonist, Okwonko is a “tragic hero,” and Graff thinks her flat writing can
be improved if she adds a “so what” question. To illustrate what he meant, Graff gave
his own re-working of Ellen’s thesis, should she try to write it at a higher level like “try-
ing to get it published or submitting it as a Master’s thesis.” His version reads:
“Though in obvious ways an evil man, Okonkwo nevertheless achieves a
kind of tragic stature in the colonialist setting of the novel. As a residual Afri-
can tribesman whose culture is being destroyed by the forces of colonialism
and modernization that arrive in the novel’s final chapters, Okonkwo is as
much the tragic victim as the victimizer of others. On the other hand, though
Okonkwo might be a victim to most postcolonial readers, he would certainly
be a victimizer to feminists.” (all quotes, p. 162)
This introduction of a “naysayer” into the text shows that it is possible to do so wit-
hout ever grappling with the problems of the text. Just as the high-school student, El-
len, could have uncomprehendingly repeated platitudes about Okonkwo being a
“tragic hero,” so too the master’s student, Ellen, could have safely repeated the scho-
larly commonplaces of various academic groupings without ever challenging herself
to think about what it means to use the term “evil” in reference to Okwonko, or to ask
what his “tragedy” does to her understanding of the world. In the worst case, it is
easy to imagine someonewriting fifty pages of themost learned, reference-laden pro-
se without ever going beyond a timorous deference to established writers who are
treated as moral and intellectual authorities. Graff does not desire such blandness,
but, without Kaufmann’s approach, it is an open question as to whether he can guard
against it. In this respect, see writing manual he recently co-wrote with Cathy Bir-
kenstein, “They Say/I Say” The Moves that Matter in Academic Writing (Nor-
ton:2006). This book has a number of excellent suggestions for pushing writers (not
just students) to think more carefully about their arguments and ask themselves “who
cares.” Yet if the way they answer that question is to look to outside authorities, they
may never discover the “intellectualism” that Graff and Birkenstock seek.
put it, “every reader tends to see what he likes and not see what makes
him uncomfortable. Least of all does one think of the author as a hu-
man being like oneself.”42 Humanistic education will only be effec-
tive if it strives to overcome this partial vision. Pedagogy aiming to
“teach the conflicts” should be informed by the Socratic ethos that
Kaufmann evokes. Indeed, for college students to profit from teach-
ing the conflicts at all their earlier education must prepare to have
high standards of responsibility in making intellectual judgments.
Graff seems to want these standards, but does not talk about what
they are or how students are to obtain them. This point was brought
out well in a perceptive and critical review of Clueless in Academe by
Sandra Stotsky. She made the point that college English students are
unlikely to use Graff’s guidelines to integrate themselves into intel-
lectual culture if, earlier, “they have not learned that they must first
read and try to understand what the author wrote.”43 From this per-
spective, Kaufmann’s work is not only relevant for debates in higher
education, but for discussions of education as a whole.
7.
In the end, Kaufmann re-directs attention from questions about
technique and sectarian academic schools to focus it on purposes and
goals. One of the nastiest—but I think one of the most helpful—com-
ments he made in his book concerns the doleful consequences of an
academic system that discouraged reflection on these themes:
For roughly twenty years, from about 1950 until 1970, large
numbers of students entered graduate schools and then went
on to teach philosophy, or history, or religion, literature, or
art, without ever having seriously reflected on their goals.
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42 TFH, 188.
43 Review ofGraff’s Clueless in Academe, Sandra Stotsky (American Journal of
Education, volume 112 (2005), p. 149–152. It can also be noted that the example Graff
provided of Ellen writing about Okwonko’s “tragic flaw” testifies to a student who, ap-
parently, was not pressed to clarify to herself the meaning of what she read. After all,
the meaning of tragic flaw or harmartia derives primarily from Aristotle’s Poetics.
Like everything else treated in that slimwork, itsmeaning is outlined only briefly there,
and has subsequently received centuries of the most conflicting exposition. Whether it
is useful to apply the concept to Achebe’s 20th-century novel all depends onwhat Ellen
understands the book to mean. This was Stotsky’s point in the first place.
Going into graduate work was rarely experienced as a fateful
plunge; on the contrary, it meant staying in school for a few
more years, a prolongation of the status quo.44
Kaufmann concluded:
Obviously, something had gone wrong in education some
time before this. When so many people trained in the humani-
ties, and quite especially in philosophy had examined their
own lives and goals so little, their own training must have
been a far cry from the heritage of Socrates.45
As I see it, this is not a personal swipe (or, not only one). In-
structors willing to reflect on their own goals probably (perhaps not
invariably) will be willing to reflect on and confront the intertwined
goals of a text.46 This starts the “culture shock.”
8.
Practical suggestions (or an elaboration on what Graff called
the “so what” question). Both those sympathetic and unsympathetic
with everything said so far will want to know whether The Future of
the Humanities has indeed actually shaped anyone’s teaching. Here
are two ways it influenced mine:
• Kaufmann’s book strengthened an already held opinion that
what is really at stake in the humanities is honesty. In particular,
Kaufmann’s book makes a good case that humanities classes should
be “Socratic” in the sense that they enable us to identify unexamined
assumptions in past and present civilizations, and then consider their
viability. In practice, this means that the texts I assign (my canon) are
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44 TFH, p. 176.
45 TFH, p. 177.
46 The philosopher, MarthaNussbaum has gone on record saying that “one thing
that my work in development has shown me very clearly is that a public policy made
without the influence of the humanities is likely to be a cramped and crude policy.”
Nussbaum, I believe, is not alone in this sentiment, and it is easy to think of caseswhere
public policy could have been more effective and humane if policy makers only had a
wider and deeper imagination. Still, even if this is true, it does not follow that everyone
educated in the humanities has something insightful and humane to say about public
policy. Only when humanistic intellectuals are truly self-critical and rigorous with
themselves does this argument about public policy begin to acquire plausibility. See
Nussbaum’s comments in Liberal Education, Summer 2001, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p. 38.
texts I think lead us to confront reigning values, either reaffirming or
critiquing them (or both). Following this, I ask students to read and
discuss the works where they must keep asking themselves whether
they are truthfully identifying the texts main challenges, and whet-
her they are grappling with these challenges with genuine candor.
My writing assignments are more systematized versions of these two
questions. Though my classes are for undergraduates, I see no reason
why teachers of younger students could not adapt Kaufmann’s ideas
for their own ends.
• Kaufmann’s book helps one cope with the inevitable mortal-
ity of the humanities, and its possible replacement by new branches
of the natural sciences. Just as the votive statues and oracle bones of
past ages testify to the very large number of human values systems
that have been forgotten, ignored or abandoned, so too, future gener-
ations (should there be any) could easily relegate all our current ef-
forts to a small, esoteric, and perhaps not entirely edifying, nook in
the history of the human knowledge. Nevertheless, what future gen-
erations might or might not think should not influence us. Someday
people may eliminate the need for rational discussion, the encounter
with distinctive points of view, and the honest consideration of alter-
natives. Until now, the natural sciences have not been able to come
up with viable replacements for these practices. Perhaps they never
will, though it seems probable that they will make some very good
efforts in trying. Until then, I think the best way to think about the fu-
ture of the humanities is to take Kaufmann’s warnings about “blind-
ness” to heart, and never stop reflecting on aims and goals.
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Dejvid Pikus
VOLTER KAUFMAN I BUDUÆNOST HUMANISTIÈKIH
DISCIPLINA
Rezime
Volter Kaufman (1921-1980) je ostao upamæen po svom delu o Nièeu. Me-
ðutim, od 1950. do kraja ivota, on je stvorio široki i provokativni opus filozofske
kritike. U jezgru Kaufmanovih napora bila je zabrinutost za humanistièke discipline i
njihovu ulogu u modernom intelektualnom ivotu. Kaufmanovo glavno promišljanje
te teme, delo The Future of the Humanities (1970) zasluuje više panje nego što mu
je do sada bilo poklanjano. Ono pronalazi naèin da sjedini dva temeljna cilja savre-
mene teorije, potragu za autentiènošæu i elju za promovisanjem kritièkog duha.
Tema ovog èlanka jeste naèin na koji je Kaufman postigao te ciljeve, a što svedoèi o
njegovoj trajnoj relevantnosti za one kojima je stalo do humanistièkih disciplina.
Kljuène reèi: humanistièke discipline, autentiènost, kritièki duh.
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